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Abstract
Set-valued risk measures on Lpd with 0 ≤ p ≤ ∞ for conical market models
are defined, primal and dual representation results are given. The collection of
initial endowments which allow to super-hedge a multivariate claim are shown
to form the values of a set-valued sublinear (coherent) risk measure. Scalar risk
measures with multiple eligible assets also turn out to be a special case within
the set-valued framework.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to establish primal and dual representation results for set-
valued risk measures in conical markets, thus extending the results of [10] to the case
of random exchange rates at terminal time. The model includes markets with bid-
ask price spreads at initial and terminal time, generated for example by proportional
transaction costs. The model considered here is much more realistic and better suited
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for applications than the ones used in [10] and [13] since, for example, those models
cannot be linked with no-arbitrage type results for conical market models. In this
paper, we will provide the link between set-valued risk measures and super-replication
theorems for conical market models, the latter established for example in [14], [17].
Moreover, new features will turn up in the random exchange rate case, most notably
that risk measures may not be compatible with the chosen market model. This means
that some risk measures may not yield all risk compensating initial positions for some
random payoffs, since results of trading operations at initial and/or terminal time
according to the market may not be part of the acceptance set belonging to the risk
measure. This could be of advantage, for example, if there is no consensus about the
market model, or if one wishes to be very conservative.
From a mathematical point of view, we show that compatibility with the market
at initial time determines the image space of a set-valued risk measure, whereas com-
patibility with the market at terminal time turns out to be a monotonicity property.
This relationship has not been observed before: In [4] only scalar risk measures for
multivariate positions are considered without reference to a market model. In [13] and
[10] (set-valued) risk measures for a static market are defined such that compatibility
is automatic, whereas in [5] set-valued risk measures are investigated without reference
to a market model.
Finally, we shall show that even scalar risk measures with multiple eligible assets
as proposed in [2] fit into our framework.
The almost natural occurrence of set-valued risk measures in market models with
frictions might also boost the theory of set-valued optimization problems. The authors
do not know any other application leading to a (primal) set-valued optimization prob-
lem: In the context of the present paper, a problem like ”minimize the (set-valued)
risk of a multivariate position subject to some constraints” makes perfectly sense from
an application point of view, and this opens the door to a all new research area.
The departing point is chosen similar to the one in [2]: We are given a set of
multivariate random variables which are specified according to the risk tolerance of a
regulator or supervisor (in the following: regulator). This set, the regulator acceptance
set, satisfies only minimal requirements. The regulator acceptance set is, as usual, in
one-to-one correspondence with a regulator risk measure. The investor or financial
agent (in the following: agent) may add particular features in order to evaluate the
risk of a multivariate outcome of her actions. For example, she wants to (or has to)
take a market model into account. This leads to augmented (agent) acceptance sets
which will have particular properties, and to corresponding risk measures.
2
The augmentation procedure for the acceptance set as described in section 2.4 will
shed new light on the interplay between risk specifications of a regulator and the degrees
of freedom for agents. For example, we think it is very reasonable that a regulator need
not be concerned about specific market models, but just about tolerable outcomes. On
the other hand, the market model already is a choice of the agent. In this paper, we
assume that the agent did choose a specific (conical) market model. If she does not feel
sure about the model, she at least could either do a sensitivity analysis with respect
to the market model, or just stick to the regulator risk measure. The first possibility
is beyond the scope of this paper, but it seems to be a very interesting topic for future
research. The second possibility is easily done using the results below.
The tools used for modeling (convex) set-valued risk measures for multivariate
random variables and in particular, the duality formulas necessary to establish dual
representation results rely on the approach given in [9]. It turns out that this approach
matches perfectly the needs of risk measures and superhedging theorems for conical
markets models. In particular, our dual variables, namely some simple set-valued
functions, and the conditions they have to satisfy have a meaning in terms of the
financial market model. We can hardly see how this goal could be achieved by sticking
to a vector-valued duality theory in which usually linear operators feature as dual
elements.
The main result of the paper is the dual representation theorem for convex set-
valued risk measures for conical market models (theorem 4.2 below). It can be seen
as a duality result for a set-valued optimization problem. Indeed, if one starts with a
(closed convex) set A of acceptable random variables the risk measure corresponding
to A is given as an infimum in a set-valued sense which here is (the closure of) a
union. On the other hand, the duality result produces a representation of the set-
valued (proper closed convex) risk measure as a supremum of its set-valued affine
minorants. The supremum is taken in a complete lattice of sets with respect to ”⊇”,
so it is an intersection.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we define regulator acceptance
sets, describe augmentation procedures, the construction of risk measures and the one-
to-one relationships between classes of set-valued risk measures and acceptance sets.
Sections 3 and 4 include the duality results. Section 5 is devoted to examples the
most important of which is the link between set-valued coherent risk measures and
superhedging theorems for conical market models. We also include set-valued versions
of value at risk, the worst case risk measure and average value at risk as well as a
discussion of risk measures in a multiple eligible asset market. In the appendix, some
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technical results are recalled or proven.
2 From acceptance sets to risk measures
2.1 Acceptance sets
We are given a probability space (Ω,FT , P ). By L
0
d = L
0
d (Ω,FT , P ) we denote the
linear space of all P -measurable functions X : Ω → IRd, and by Lpd = L
p
d (Ω,FT , P ),
0 < p ≤ ∞, the linear space of all such functions with
∫
Ω
|X (ω)|p dP < +∞ for
0 < p < ∞, and ess.supω∈Ω |X (ω)| < ∞ for p = ∞. In all cases, |·| stands for an
arbitrary, but fixed norm on IRd, and the usual identification of functions differing only
on sets of P -measure zero is assumed. As usual, we write
(Lpd)+ =
{
X ∈ Lpd : X ∈ IR
d
+ P − a.s.
}
for the closed convex cone of IRd-valued random variables with P -almost surely non-
negative components. An element X ∈ Lpd has components X1, . . . , Xd in L
p = Lp1.
The symbol 1I denotes the random variable in Lp1 which has P -almost surely the value
1.
In this paper, for X ∈ Lpd, the values of Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ d, are understood as the number
of units of asset i an agent holds at terminal time T . Thus, we follow Kabanov’s idea
[14] in assuming that a portfolio is represented in ”physical units” of the traded assets
(instead of its value in a fixed currency/nume´raire).
Following [2] we consider an acceptance set given by a regulator as the object with
”conceptual primacy [...] in risk measurement”.
Definition 2.1 An acceptance set is a subset A ⊆ Lpd with 0 ≤ p ≤ ∞ satisfying
IRd1I ∩ A 6= ∅, IRd1I ∩ (Lpd\A) 6= ∅ and A + (L
p
d)+ ⊆ A.
We consider the properties in definition 2.1 as the minimal requirements to be asked
of an acceptance set. We see them as rational in the sense that every regulator would
agree upon them. The first two simply mean that there is a deterministic portfolio
which is accepted by the regulator, but the regulator does not accept all deterministic
portfolios. The last two properties imply a weak condition of the boundedness-from-
below type: There is x ∈ IRd such that
(
x1I− (Lpd)+
)
∩ A = ∅. Indeed, otherwise for
each x ∈ IRd there would existX ∈ (Lpd)+ such that x1I−X ∈ A, hence x1I ∈ X+A ⊆ A.
This would be IRd1I ⊆ A contradicting IRd1I∩ (Lpd\A) 6= ∅. Compare [8], (4.3), (4.4) for
similar requirements in the univariate case.
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Note that in [2] (p. 3, (iii)) a subset of L01 is called an acceptance set if its elements,
interpreted as ”future values of financial positions”, are ”in line with the risk tolerance
of the supervisor”, but no mathematical assumptions are required. We deviate a little
from this approach since otherwise the term ”acceptance set” would just be tantamount
with ”subset of L0d”.
2.2 Eligible portfolios
A regulator usually asks for a deposit, to be made at initial time, to compensate for the
risk of an investment. This deposit could be given, for instance, in cash of a specific
currency, cash of several currencies, units of other nume´raires, or even positions with
fixed proportions of several of such assets. The set of such positions spans a linear space
M , the space of eligible portfolios. Without loss of generality, we assume M ⊆ IRd,
i.e. all eligible assets are included in the set of the ”traded” assets. The following
two conditions describe the relationship between the space of eligible portfolios and an
acceptance set:
(A1a) M1I ∩ A 6= ∅ and
(A1b) M1I ∩ (Lpd\A) 6= ∅.
(A1a) says that there is an eligible portfolio which is acceptable at terminal time.
(A1b) says that not every eligible portfolio is acceptable at terminal time. Of course,
(A1a), (A1b) are stronger than the first two requirements in definition 2.1.
2.3 Risk measures
A risk measure will turn out to be a function which maps multivariate random variables
into the power set P (M) of the space M of eligible portfolios (including the empty set
∅). We associate with a function R : Lpd → P (M), as usual, its graph defined by
graphR = {(X, u) ∈ Lpd ×M : u ∈ R (X)} .
Definition 2.2 A function R : Lpd → P (M) is called translative in M or just M-
translative iff
∀X ∈ Lpd, ∀u ∈M : R (X + u1I) = R (X)− u. (2.1)
Let B ⊆ Lpd. A function R : L
p
d → P (M) is called B-monotone iff
X2 −X1 ∈ B ⇒ R
(
X2
)
⊇ R
(
X1
)
.
In the following definition, we identify risk measures among all functions into P (M).
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Definition 2.3 A risk measure is a function R : Lpd → P (M) with 0 ≤ p ≤ ∞ which
is M-translative and (Lpd)+-monotone. A risk measure is said to be finite at zero if it
satisfies
(R1a) R (0) 6= ∅ and
(R1b) R (0) 6=M .
The value R (X) of a risk measure R is understood to include the eligible portfolio
vectors which compensate for the risk of X .
The interpretation of (R1a) is, of course, that there is an eligible portfolio at initial
time which compensates for the risk of the zero payoff at terminal time. (R1b) just
means that not all eligible portfolios compensate for the risk of the zero payoff.
The interpretation of M-translativity is straightforward if one recalls the scalar
case, see [1], [2], [8].
The monotonicity condition says that a random portfolio vector which is compo-
nentwise not less than another in (almost) all scenarios should admit more risk com-
pensating eligible portfolios. Therefore, the partial order ⊇ is the relation of choice in
the image space P (M).
Let a set A ⊆ Lpd be given. By
RA (X) = {u ∈M : X + u1I ∈ A} (2.2)
a function RA : L
p
d → P (M) is defined. If A is an acceptance set, then the interpre-
tation of (2.2) is, of course, that RA (X) includes all eligible portfolios which, when
added to X , compensate for the risk of X , i.e. lead to an overall position in A.
Conversely, we associate with a function R : Lpd → P (M) the set
AR = {X ∈ L
p
d : 0 ∈ R (X)} . (2.3)
If R is a risk measure, then AR includes those positions X which have zero among its
risk compensating eligible portfolios, i.e. a position X is acceptable in terms of the
risk measure R if it can be made acceptable without additional initial endowment.
As in the scalar case, there is a one-to-one correspondence between families of M-
translative functions and families of subsets of Lpd via (2.2), (2.3). The following simple
result provides the basic relationship.
Proposition 2.4 Let A ⊆ Lpd be given. Then, the function RA is M-translative and
A = ARA . Conversely, let R : L
p
d → P (M) be M-translative. Then R = RAR .
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Proof. From (2.2), (2.3) we get
ARA = {X ∈ L
p
d : 0 ∈ RA (X)} = {X ∈ L
p
d : 0 ∈ {u ∈M : X + u1I ∈ A}} = A
as desired. A direct calculation using (2.2), (2.3) and (2.1) yields
RAR (X) = {u ∈ M : X + u1I ∈ AR}
= {u ∈ M : 0 ∈ R (X + u1I)} = R (X) .
This completes the proof. 
Proposition 2.5 Let A ⊆ Lpd be an acceptance set. Then, the function RA is a risk
measure. If A satisfies (A1a), (A1b), then RA is finite at zero. Conversely, let R : L
p
d →
P (M) be a risk measure. Then, AR is an acceptance set. If R is finite at zero, then
AR satisfies (A1a), (A1b).
Proof. This follows from proposition 2.4 and 6.5 (a) (with B = (Lpd)+), (b), (c)
in the appendix. 
Additional properties may (and will) be required for acceptance sets and risk mea-
sures. Most importantly, conditions for the compatibility of the acceptance set with
the market model are given in the following section.
2.4 Market-compatibility
So far, acceptance sets and risk measures have nothing to do with the financial market.
This is on purpose: The regulator should not be concerned about the question what
market model ”describes the reality”. Moreover, we see the market model as a choice
of the agent: Agents may not agree upon the model.
Once a market model is chosen, one can describe consequences for the acceptance
set and the corresponding risk measure. Here, we consider a one-period, conical market
model. It can be seen as the one-period special case of the conical models considered
in [15]. Such a model may occur if proportional transaction costs are present (see [14]
and also [13]), or a bid-ask price spread is modeled directly (see e.g. [17]).
At initial time, a closed convex cone KI ⊆ IR
d with IRd+ ⊆ KI 6= IR
d is given which
models the proportional frictions between the assets according to the geometric model
introduced in [14]. This cone is called solvency cone since it includes precisely those
(deterministic) portfolios which can be exchanged at initial time into portfolios with
only non-negative components. The part of the cone KI that is relevant for the space
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M of eligible portfolios is KMI = KI ∩M , also a closed convex cone. It is assumed
throughout the paper that M ∩ IRd+ 6= {0}. This implies in particular K
M
I 6= {0} since
IRd+ ⊆ KI .
At terminal time, the market is described by means of a measurable mapping ω 7→
KT (ω), the solvency cone mapping, with KT (ω) ⊆ IR
d a closed convex cone such that
IRd+ ⊆ KT (ω) 6= IR
d for all ω ∈ Ω. For 0 ≤ p ≤ ∞, the set
L
p
d (KT ) = {X ∈ L
p
d : P ({ω ∈ Ω: X (ω) ∈ KT (ω)}) = 1} (2.4)
is a closed convex cone in Lpd generating a reflexive transitive relation for IR
d-valued
random variables. We recall the following definition, see for example [3].
Definition 2.6 A set-valued function K : Ω→ P
(
IRd
)
is called measurable iff for each
open set B ⊆ IRd the set {ω ∈ Ω: K (ω) ∩ B 6= ∅} is an element of FT .
In contrast to [10], we allow for the additional randomness expressed by the mea-
surable set-valued function KT : It reflects the fact that the future transaction costs
and/or exchange rates are not known at initial time. In [10], K = KI ≡ KT is assumed
as in [13].
According to (2.2), if a financial agent is given an acceptance set and a final payoff
X ∈ Lpd, she is supposed to look for all eligible portfolios u ∈M which make the overall
position X + u1I acceptable. Since trading is possible at initial and terminal time, two
situations may occur.
First, the agent might be interested to know about all eligible portfolios which can
be exchanged into an eligible portfolio which in turn makes a given payoff X ∈ Lpd
acceptable. Suppose u ∈M is such that u′ ∈ u−KMI makes X acceptable, that is, the
investor can exchange u into u′ at initial time (and stay in M) in order to get a risk
compensating eligible portfolio for X . Then X + u1I ∈ A + KMI 1I, that is, the agent
looks for
RA+KM
I
1I (X) =
{
u ∈M : X + u1I ∈ A+KMI 1I
}
= RA (X) +K
M
I .
(the reader easily verifies the last equation). From the point of view of the regulator it
does not matter if the agent starts with initial endowment u or u′: If A is the acceptance
set given by the regulator and X + u1I 6∈ A, then the agent has to exchange u into u′
and give u′ as deposit in order to make X acceptable. For the agent, however, it could
make a difference since a transaction might not be desirable for her. On the other
hand, it clearly is of advantage for the agent to know all initial endowments which –
maybe after a transaction at initial time – admit to compensate for the risk of X .
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Secondly, the agent might be interested to know what risks she could cover with a
given available eligible portfolio u ∈M . Of course, every X ∈ Lpd such thatX+u1I ∈ A.
Moreover, if X + u1I 6∈ A, but she can exchange X for X ′ at terminal time such that
X ′+u1I ∈ A, it is reasonable for her to consider u as a risk compensating portfolio forX ,
too: Indeed, there is no additional initial endowment necessary, but just an exchange
from X to X ′ at time T . Since in this case X ′ ∈ X −KT a.s. and X
′ + u1I ∈ A we
have X + u1I ∈ A + Lpd (KT ). Thus, the agent looks for
RA+Lp
d
(KT ) (X) = {u ∈M : X + u1I ∈ A + L
p
d (KT )} .
Again, from the point of view of the regulator it does not matter how the agent ends
up with a position in A. From the point of view of the agent it could make a difference:
Not only that an exchange might not be desirable, the chosen market model could be
wrong. In the latter case, the required exchange at terminal time could be impossible
leaving the agent with a non-acceptable position. This certainly is a motivation for the
agent to look at both of RA and RA+Lp
d
(KT ).
The above considerations justify the following definition.
Definition 2.7 An acceptance set A is called KT -compatible iff A+L
p
d (KT ) ⊆ A, and
it is called KI-compatible iff A+K
M
I 1I ⊆ A.
A risk measure is called KT -compatible iff it is L
p
d (KT )-monotone, and it is called
KI-compatible iff it maps into the set P
M
K =
{
D ⊆M : D = D +KMI
}
.
An acceptance set or a risk measure is called market-compatible iff it is KI- and
KT -compatible.
Trivially, if A is an acceptance set, A+Lpd (KT ) is KT -compatible, A+K
M
I 1I is KI-
compatible, and A+Lpd (KT )+K
M
I 1I is market-compatible, and A is market-compatible
if and only if A + Lpd (KT ) + K
M
I 1I = A. Of course it is of interest (and done below)
to establish conditions under which RA (X) = RA (X) +K
M
I and/or RA = RA+Lpd(KT ),
respectively. The reader may note that the question wether or not a risk measure is
market-compatible is a new feature in the multi-variate case which does not occur (or
is trivial) if scalar risk measures for univariate positions are under consideration.
Proposition 2.8 Let A ⊆ Lpd be a KT -compatible (KI-compatible, market-compatible)
acceptance set. Then, RA is a KT -compatible (KI-compatible, market-compatible) risk
measure.
Conversely, let R : Lpd → P (M) be aKT -compatible (KI-compatible, market-compatible)
risk measure. Then, AR is a KT -compatible (KI-compatible, market-compatible) accep-
tance set.
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Proof. Follows from proposition 6.5 (a), (d). 
The following simple example shows that not every ”intuitive” acceptance set is
market-compatible.
Example 2.9 Let d = m = 2 and KI = K
M
I =
{
x ∈ IR2 : x2 ≥ −2x1, x2 ≥ 0
}
. For
all ω ∈ Ω let KT =
{
x ∈ IR2 : x2 ≥ −
1
2
x1, x1 ≥ 0
}
. The point u = (−1, 4) is in KI , but
not in KT . Let us for the moment accept positions in A = L
p
2 (KT ). Then X = 0 ∈ L
p
2
is certainly an acceptable position. However, the position X+u1I = u1I is not acceptable
despite the fact that u can be transferred into a ”strictly” positive position at initial
time, that is A is not KI-compatible. On the other hand, of course A is KT -compatible.
As in the previous example, the ”intuitive” worst case acceptance set Lpd (KT ) is
the standard example of a set which is KT -compatible, but not market-compatible in
general. See section 5.4 for more details.
Remark 2.10 The set −Lpd (KT )−KI1I is the set of all terminal positions which can be
generated with zero initial costs, that is starting with the zero portfolio at initial time.
A pair (u′, X ′) ∈ IRd×Lpd satisfying u
′ ∈ −KI and X
′ ∈ u′1I−KT almost surely is called
a self-financing portfolio process for the one-period market (KI , KT ) (see [17]). Thus,
u ∈ M makes X ∈ Lpd acceptable with respect to the market-compatible acceptance set
A + Lpd (KT ) + K
M
I 1I if and only if there is a self-financing portfolio process (u
′, X ′)
such that u′ ∈ M and X +X ′ + u1I ∈ A.
Remark 2.11 The set A + KMI 1I satisfies (A1b) if and only if A ⊆ L
0
d satisfies a
certain boundedness from below condition with respect to the cone KMI . Indeed,
A +KMI 1I satisfies (A1b) ⇔ ∃u ∈M : u1I 6∈ A+K
M
I 1I
⇔ ∃u ∈M ∀k ∈ KMI : (u− k) 1I 6∈ A
⇔ ∃u ∈M :
(
u−KMI
)
1I ∩A = ∅.
With a similar argument, one may verify that A ⊆ L0d satisfies (A1a) if and only if
A+KMI 1I does.
2.5 Diversification and convexity issues
It is widely acknowledged that convexity is a useful property of acceptance sets and
risk measures. For example, the criticism against the use of value at risk as a risk
measure is based on the lack of convexity.
While the definition of convexity for an acceptance set A ⊆ Lpd, being a subset of a
linear space, is the usual one, we use the following definitions for functions R : Lpd →
P (M). The reader who is familiar with [10] may observe that this approach deviates
from the one in the quoted paper where only market-compatible risk measures have
been considered.
Definition 2.12 A function R : Lpd → P (M) is called convex iff
∀X,X ′ ∈ Lpd, ∀t ∈ (0, 1) : R (tX + (1− t)X
′) ⊇ tR (X) + (1− t)R (X ′) .
It is called positively homogeneous iff
∀X ∈ Lpd, ∀t ∈ (0, 1) : R (tX) ⊇ tR (X) ,
and it is called subadditive iff
∀X,X ′ ∈ Lpd : R (X +X
′) ⊇ R (X) +R (X ′) .
A positively homogeneous and subadditive function is called sublinear.
The above definition of convexity just means that the ”mixed” position tX +
(1− t)X ′ admits at least the risk compensating eligible portfolios which could be
obtained by mixing the ones for X and X ′. Alternative characterizations of these
properties in terms of the graph of R can be found in the appendix, section 6.3. More-
over, the values of a convex set-valued function R are convex (choose X = X ′ in the
above definition), and R (0) is a cone if R is positively homogeneous. If R is sublinear,
then the convex cone R (0) is included in the recession cone of R (X) for each X since
R (X + 0) ⊇ R (X) +R (0) for each X ∈ Lpd.
Proposition 2.13 Let A ⊆ Lpd be an acceptance set which is convex (closed under
addition, a cone). Then, RA is a convex (subadditive, positively homogeneous) risk
measure. Conversely, let R : Lpd → P (M) be a convex (subadditive, positively homo-
geneous) risk measure. Then, AR is an acceptance set which is convex (closed under
addition, a cone).
Proof. Follows from proposition 6.5 (e), (f), (g). 
As usual, a sublinear risk measure is called coherent. We immediately obtain the
one-to-one correspondence between coherent risk measures (and being finite at zero)
and acceptance set which are convex cones (and satisfying (A1a), (A1b)).
Remark 2.14 If the acceptance set A is convex (a cone), then the market-compatible
augmented acceptance set A+ Lpd (KT ) +K
M
I 1I again is convex (a cone).
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2.6 Closedness
Closedness assumptions are inevitable for convex duality results. Given an acceptance
set A, the corresponding risk measure RA may have two different closedness properties.
First, it may have closed values. Secondly, its graph may be closed. These two prop-
erties correspond to two different properties of the acceptance set A. While the one
corresponding to closedness of the graph is closedness of A in Lpd, the closedness prop-
erty of A which corresponds to closed values of RA is more involved. In the following
definition, we use the symbol uk
M
−→ 0 in order to denote a sequence
{
uk
}
k∈IN
⊂ M
with limk→∞ u
k = 0.
Definition 2.15 A set A ⊆ Lpd is called directionally closed inM iff X ∈ L
p
d, u
k M−→ 0
and X + uk1I ∈ A for all k ∈ IN imply X ∈ A. For an arbitrary set A ⊆ Lpd, the set
clMA =
{
X ∈ Lpd : ∃u
k M−→ 0: ∀k ∈ IN: X + uk1I ∈ A
}
is called the directional closure of A in M .
Of course, a closed set A is directionally closed with respect to each linear subspace
M ⊆ IRd. See the appendix for more information about this property. Note also that
a set-valued function R with a closed graph has closed values.
Proposition 2.16 Let A ⊆ Lpd be an acceptance set which is directionally closed with
respect to M (closed in Lpd). Then, RA is a risk measure with closed values (a closed
graph). Conversely, let R : Lpd → P (M) be a risk measure with closed values (a closed
graph). Then, AR is an acceptance set which is directionally closed with respect to M
(closed in Lpd).
Proof. Follows from proposition 6.5 (i), (k). 
Remark 2.17 If the acceptance set A is closed (directionally closed in M), then the
market-compatible augmented acceptance set A+Lpd (KT ) +K
M
I 1I need not to be closed
(directionally closed in M) in general.
Remark 2.18 Lemma 6.2 (see appendix) makes the following construction possible.
If an acceptance set is not directionally closed in M (or one just does not know), then
the function
X 7→ cl {u ∈M : X + u1I ∈ A}
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coincides with RclMA. Since clM is a hull operator (see lemma 6.1), for each acceptance
set B ⊆ Lpd with A ⊆ B which is directionally closed in M we have
∀X ∈ Lpd : RB (X) ⊇ RclMA (X) .
Similarly, if A is not closed (or one just does not know), then the graph of the
function
X 7→ {u ∈M : X + u1I ∈ clA}
coincides with cl (graphRA) (and is of course graphRclA). For each M-translative
function R with a closed graph including the graph of RA we have
∀X ∈ Lpd : R (X) ⊇ RclA (X) .
3 Dual variables
In the next two sections, we will give dual representation results. Therefore, we shall
assume 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ in the following. In case p =∞ we consider the dual pair (L∞d , L
1
d)
with σ (L∞d , L
1
d)-topology on L
∞
d . In all other cases, L
p
d is paired with L
q
d for
1
p
+ 1
q
= 1
and their respective norm topologies.
By K+I and
(
KMI
)+
we denote the positive dual cones of the cones KI in IR
d and
KMI in M , respectively. Thus,(
KMI
)+
=
{
v ∈ M : ∀u ∈ KMI : v
Tu ≥ 0
}
⊆M.
Note that
(
KMI
)+
=
(
K+I +M
⊥
)
∩M with M⊥ =
{
v ∈ IRd : ∀u ∈ M : vTu = 0
}
since
K+I +M
⊥ is the dual cone of KMI in IR
d. The reader should be aware that both
(
KMI
)+
and K+I +M
⊥ are dual cones of KMI , the first one in M , the second one in IR
d. We will
also use G (v) =
{
x ∈ IRd : 0 ≤ vTx
}
for v ∈ IRd being a subset of IRd, not necessarily
one of M .
By K+T we denote the set–valued mapping ω 7→ [KT (ω)]
+, and [Lpd (KT )]
+ ⊆ Lqd
denotes the dual cone of Lpd (KT ).
Lemma 3.1
[Lpd (KT )]
+ = Lqd
(
K+T
)
=
{
Y ∈ Lqd : Y (ω) ∈ K
+
T (ω) P − a.s.
}
.
Proof. ”⊇”: Let Y ∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
and X ∈ Lpd (KT ). Then, the relationships
X ∈ KT , Y ∈ K
+
T and X
TY ≥ 0 hold P–almost surly. Consequently, E
[
XTY
]
≥ 0.
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”⊆”: Assume Y ∈
[
L
p
d
(
K+T
)]+
but Y 6∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
. Then, there is a set A ∈ F
with P (A) > 0 such that Y (ω) 6∈ K+T (ω) for all ω ∈ A. The function f : Ω × IR
d →
IR defined by f (ω, x) = xTY (ω) is a Caratheodory function. The set-valued map
F : Ω → P
(
IRd
)
defined by F (ω) = KT (ω) ∩ B1 (0) is measurable and compact–
valued. Since, for each ω ∈ Ω, f (ω, ·) is continuous and F (ω) is compact, Φ (ω) ={
x ∈ F (ω) : f (ω, x) = infy∈F (ω) f (ω, y)
}
is nonempty. Moreover, Φ (ω) is closed. By
[3, theorem 8.2.11], Φ: Ω → P
(
IRd
)
is a measurable set-valued map which has a
measurable selection X by [3, theorem 8.1.3]. Since, for all ω ∈ Ω,
X (ω)T Y (ω) = inf
y∈F (ω)
yTY (ω) ≤ 0
because of 0 ∈ F (ω) and, for all ω ∈ A, X (ω)T Y (ω) < 0 because of Y (ω) 6∈ K+T (ω)
we have E
[
XTY
]
< 0, a contradiction to Y ∈ [Lpd (KT )]
+. 
The following definition introduces a class of set-valued functions which will be used
as a substitute for continuous linear functionals on Lpd, p ≥ 1. These functions depend
on an additional dual variable which reflects the order relation in the image spaces IRd
and M , generated by the cones KI and K
M
I , respectively.
Definition 3.2 Take Y ∈ Lqd and v ∈M . Define a function F
M
(Y,v) : L
p
d → P (M) by
FM(Y,v) [X ] =
{
u ∈ M : E
[
XTY
]
≤ vTu
}
. (3.1)
The following proposition collects elementary properties of these functions for future
reference. Compare also proposition 4.1 in [10] and proposition 6 in [9].
Proposition 3.3 Let Y ∈ Lqd and v ∈M . Then, the function R : L
p
d → P (M) defined
by R (X) = FM(Y,v) [−X ]
(a) is additive and positively homogeneous with FM(Y,v) [0] = G (v)∩M =
{
x ∈M : 0 ≤ vTx
}
;
(b) has a closed graph, and hence closed values, namely closed half spaces;
(c) is finite at zero if and only if it is finite everywhere if and only if v ∈ M\ {0};
moreover, R (X) ∈ {M, ∅} for each X ∈ Lpd if and only if v = 0;
(d) is M-translative if and only if v ∈ E [Y ] +M⊥;
(e) is KT -compatible if and only if Y ∈ L
q
d
(
K+T
)
;
(f) is KI-compatible if and only if v ∈
(
KMI
)+
\ {0}
(g) has the acceptance set AR =
{
X ∈ Lpd : 0 ≤ E
[
XTY
]}
.
Proof. (a) Can be checked directly, see proposition 4.1 in [10]. (b) The graph of R
is the set
{
(X, u) ∈ Lpd ×M : E
[
XTY
]
≤ vTu
}
which is a closed half space in Lpd×M
14
since X 7→ E
[
XTY
]
is a continuous linear functional on Lpd (also with respect to the
σ (L∞d , L
1
d)-topology if p =∞). (c) Easily checked. (d) Take X ∈ L
p
d, u ∈M . Then
FM(Y,v) [−X − u1I] =
{
z ∈ M : E
[
(X + u1I)T Y
]
+ vT z ≥ 0
}
=
{
z ∈ M : E
[
XTY
]
+ E [Y ]T u+ vT z ≥ 0
}
=
{
z + u ∈M : E
[
XTY
]
+ (E [Y ]− v)T u+ vT (z + u) ≥ 0
}
− u
= FM(Y,v) [−X ]− u.
The last equation in this chain is true if and only if E [Y ] − v ∈ M⊥. (e) Take
X1, X2 ∈ Lpd such that X
2 −X1 ∈ Lpd (KT ), and u ∈ F
M
(Y,v) [−X
1]. Then
E
[(
−X2
)T
Y
]
+ E
[(
X2 −X1
)T
Y
]
≤ vTu,
and since Y ∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
we have E
[
(X2 −X1)
T
Y
]
≥ 0. This proves u ∈ FM(Y,v) [−X
2],
hence R is KT -compatible. Conversely, if Y 6∈ L
q
d
(
K+T
)
there is X ∈ Lpd (KT ) such that
E
[
XTY
]
< 0. From KT -compatibility with X
1 = −X , X2 = 0 we get
FM(Y,v) [X ] ⊆ G (v) ∩M
which is {
u ∈M : E
[
XTY
]
≤ vTu
}
⊆
{
u ∈M : 0 ≤ vTu
}
.
Since E
[
XTY
]
< 0 there is a u ∈ M belonging to the left hand side which is not an
element of the right hand side. This contradicts Y 6∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
. (f) This simply follows
since vT (u) ≤ vT (u+ k) for all k ∈ KMI if and only if v ∈
(
KMI
)+
. (g) Obvious. 
Remark 3.4 The functions X 7→ FM(Y,v) [X ] , F
M
(Y,v) [−X ] map into the collection
GM =
{
D ⊆ IRd : D = cl co
(
D +KMI
)}
iff v ∈
(
KMI
)+
.
The next result admits a change of variables from vector densities Y to vector
probability measures Q. This allows a formulation of the dual representation result in
terms of probability measures as it is common in the scalar case. In contrast, super-
hedging and no-arbitrage type results for conical market models are usually formulated
in terms of consistent pricing processes, see e.g. [17], [15] and also [13]. We will discuss
the relationship in more detail below.
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In the following, diag (w) with w ∈ IRd denotes the diagonal matrix with the com-
ponents of w as entries in its main diagonal and zero elsewhere. Moreover, MP1,d =
MP1,d (Ω,FT ) denotes the set of all vector probability measures with components being
absolutely continuous with respect to P , i.e. Qi : FT → [0, 1] is a probability measure
on (Ω,FT ) such that
dQi
dP
∈ L1 for i = 1, . . . , d.
Lemma 3.5 (i) Let Y ∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
, v ∈
(
E [Y ] +M⊥
)
∩
(
KMI
)+
\ {0}. Then there are
Q ∈ MP1,d, w ∈ K
+
I \M
⊥ +M⊥ such that diag (w) dQ
dP
∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
and FM(Y,v) = F˜
M
(Q,w)
with
F˜M(Q,w) [X ] =
{
u ∈ M : wTEQ [X ] ≤ wTu
}
=
(
EQ [X ] +G (w)
)
∩M. (3.2)
(ii) Vice versa, if Q ∈MP1,d, w ∈ K
+
I \M
⊥+M⊥ such that diag (w) dQ
dP
∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
then
there are Y ∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
, v ∈
(
E [Y ] +M⊥
)
∩
(
KMI
)+
\ {0} such that F˜M(Q,w) = F
M
(Y,v).
Proof. (i) Set w = E [Y ] ∈ IRd+ since K
+
T (ω) ⊆ IR
d
+ for every ω ∈ Ω, hence
L
q
d
(
K+T
)
⊆ Lqd
(
IRd+
)
. Since v ∈
(
E [Y ] +M⊥
)
∩
(
KMI
)+
\ {0} we have v ∈ w +M⊥
which is equivalent to w ∈ v+M⊥. Since v ∈
(
KMI
)+
=
(
K+I +M
⊥
)
∩M ⊆ K+I +M
⊥
we may conclude w ∈ K+I +M
⊥. Since v 6= 0 we have w 6∈M⊥, hence w ∈ K+I \M
⊥ +
M⊥.
Choose Zi =
1
wi
Yi if wi > 0, and arbitrary in (L
q
d)+ such that E [Zi] = 1 if wi =
0, i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Define Q via dQ
dP
= Z. Then Y = diag (w) dQ
dP
∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
and
E
[
XTY
]
= E
[
XTdiag (w) dQ
dP
]
= wTEQ [X ].
By assumption v ∈ w +M⊥, we have vTu = wTu for all u ∈M and
FM(Y,v) [X ] =
{
u ∈M : E
[
XTY
]
≤ vTu
}
=
{
u ∈M : wTEQ [X ] ≤ wTu
}
= F˜M(Q,w) [X ]
(3.3)
for all X ∈ Lpd.
(ii) Define Y = diag (w) dQ
dP
∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
. Then E [Y ] = w and wTEQ [X ] =
E
[
XTdiag (w) dQ
dP
]
= E
[
XTY
]
.
We claim that w ∈
(
KMI
)+
+ M⊥. Indeed, on the one hand from
(
KMI
)+
=(
K+I +M
⊥
)
∩M we get
(
KMI
)+
+M⊥ =
(
K+I +M
⊥
)
∩M +M⊥. On the other hand,
w = wM +wM⊥ with wM ∈M , wM⊥ ∈M
⊥, hence wM = w−wM⊥ ∈ K
+
I +M
⊥ which
in turn implies w ∈
(
K+I +M
⊥
)
∩M +M⊥, and the claim is proven.
Hence, there is v ∈
(
KMI
)+
such that w ∈ v +M⊥. Since w 6∈ M⊥ we have v 6= 0.
Finally, equation (3.3) also holds in this case which completes the proof of the lemma.

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Remark 3.6 The functions X 7→ F˜M(Q,w) [X ] in (3.2) may be seen as set-valued substi-
tutes for the vector expectation EQ [X ].
Remark 3.7 If M = IRd then v ∈
(
E [Y ] +M⊥
)
∩
(
KMI
)+
\ {0} if and only if v =
E [Y ] ∈ K+I \ {0}. In this case, the pair (v, Y ) is a consistent pricing process for the
one-period market model (KI , KT ). Compare for example [17] and section 5.6 below
for definitions.
Remark 3.8 The reader may note the difference between lemma 3.5, (i) above and
lemma 4.1, (i) in [10]. Since the cone KT is random we cannot ensure w = E [Y ] ∈ K
+
I
in general anymore. A simple counterexample is provided by example 2.9 modified in the
following way: Take M =
{
t (1, 1)T : t ∈ IR
}
, so that dimM = 1 and Y = E [Y ] 1I =
(1, 0)T 1I ∈ Lq2
(
K+T
)
. Then w = E [Y ] 6∈ K+I , but w ∈ K
+
I \M
⊥ +M⊥. If we take the
same w, but use M =
{
t (0, 1)T : t ∈ IR
}
then K+I \M
⊥ +M⊥ =
{
x ∈ IR2 : x2 > 0
}
and
(
E [Y ] +M⊥
)
∩
(
KMI
)+
\ {0} = ∅.
4 Dual representation
This section is devoted to dual representation results for market-compatible convex
risk measures. The following theorem is the main result of the paper. In order
to keep its formulation clear we shall precede it with a definition. Recall GM ={
D ⊆ IRd : D = cl co
(
D +KMI
)}
.
Definition 4.1 Define the set of dual variables
Wq =
{
(Q,w) ∈MP1,d × IR
d : w ∈ K+I \M
⊥ +M⊥, diag (w)
dQ
dP
∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)}
.
A function −α : Wq → GM satisfying
(P0)
⋂
(Q,w)∈Wq −α (Q,w) 6= ∅ and −α (Q,w) 6=M for at least one (Q,w) ∈ W
q and
(P1) −α (Q,w) = cl (−α (Q,w) +G (w)) ∩M for all (Q,w) ∈ Wq
is called a penalty function.
Theorem 4.2 A function R : Lpd → GM is a market-compatible closed (σ (L
∞
d , L
1
d)-
closed if p =∞) convex risk measure which is finite at zero if, and only if there is
a penalty function −αR such that
∀X ∈ Lpd : R (X) =
⋂
(Q,w)∈Wq
[
−αR (Q,w) +
(
EQ [−X ] +G (w)
)
∩M
]
. (4.1)
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In particular, for a closed (σ (L∞d , L
1
d)–closed if p = ∞) convex risk measure R being
finite at zero, (4.1) is satisfied with −αR replaced by −αR,min with
− αR,min (Q,w) = cl
⋃
X′∈AR
(
EQ [X ′] + G (w)
)
∩M. (4.2)
Moreover, if a penalty function −αR satisfies (4.1) then it holds −αR (Q,w) ⊇ −αR,min (Q,w)
for all (Q,w) ∈ Wq.
The function R is a market-compatible closed (σ (L∞d , L
1
d)-closed if p = ∞) co-
herent risk measure which is finite at zero if, and only if there is a nonempty set
WqR ⊆ W
q such that
∀X ∈ Lpd : R (X) =
⋂
(Q,w)∈Wq
R
(
EQ [−X ] +G (w)
)
∩M. (4.3)
In particular, (4.3) is satisfied with WqR replaced by W
q
R,max with
WqR,max =
{
(Q,w) ∈MP1,d × IR
d : w ∈ K+I \M
⊥ +M⊥, diag (w)
dQ
dP
∈ A+R
}
. (4.4)
Moreover, if WqR satisfies (4.3) then W
q
R ⊆ W
q
R,max.
Proof. See appendix. 
Theorem 4.2 together with remark 6.8 produces the following possibility for gener-
ating market-compatible convex risk measures. Starting with a nonempty convex set
Â ⊆ Lpd one has to ensure that A = cl
(
Â + Lpd (KT ) +K
M
I 1I
)
satisfies (A1b) (defini-
tion 2.1, A satisfies (A1a) if Â does). Then (4.1) with −αR replaced by
− αRA (Q,w) = cl
⋃
X∈A
(
EQ [X ] +G (w)
)
∩M (4.5)
produces a closed convex market-compatible risk measure which is finite at zero. This
will be useful, for example, when we consider Â = Lpd (KT ) where the robust no-
arbitrage assumption for the one-period market model (KI , KY ) ensures that already
A = Lpd (KT ) +K
M
I 1I is a closed convex acceptance set. See section 5.4 below.
Remark 4.3 Consider the special case m = d, KI = K
M
I = IR
d
+ ≡ KT , i.e. the
totally illiquid market. Theorem 4.2 produces a dual representation of a closed convex
regulator risk measure with
Wq =
{
(Q,w) ∈MP1,d × IR
d : w ∈ IRd+\ {0} , diag (w)
dQ
dP
∈ Lqd
(
IRd+
)}
.
18
Thus, the set of dual variables is larger than for any other market in the case d = m
since Rd+ ⊆ KI , R
d
+ ⊆ KT a.s., hence K
+
I , K
+
T ⊆ IR
d
+ a.s. Such a regulator risk
measure ”ignores the market” in the sense that the results of trades, possible according
to the ”real” market model, might not be included in the set of risk compensating initial
endowments for a given position X.
5 Examples
5.1 A remark about scalarization
In [10], we introduced a scalarization procedure for functions R : Lpd → P (M) by
defining extended real-valued functions ϕR,v : L
p
d → IR ∪ {±∞} given by
ϕR,v (X) = inf
u∈R(X)
vTu
for v ∈ K+I . The following simple observation will be useful for the example in section
5.2.
Proposition 5.1 Let Â ⊆ Lpd be an acceptance set and A = clM
(
Â+KMI 1I
)
. Then
∀X ∈ Lpd : ϕRA,v (X) = ϕRÂ,v (X)
whenever v ∈ K+I .
Proof. Since RA (X) ⊇ RÂ (X) we have ≤. To show the converse, take u ∈ M
such that X + u1I ∈ Â+KMI 1I. That is, there is k ∈ K
M
I such that X + (u− k) 1I ∈ Â
which is u− k ∈ RÂ (X). Hence
ϕR
Â
,v (X) ≤ v
T (u− k) ≤ vTu
since k ∈ KMI ⊆ KI and v ∈ K
+
I . A continuity argument yields that this is also true
for u ∈ M with X + u1I ∈ A = clM
(
Â +KMI 1I
)
. Hence ϕRA,v (X) ≥ ϕRÂ,v (X) as
desired. 
We note that the optimization problem to determine the value ϕRA,v (X) may have
many more solutions than the problem to determine ϕR
Â
,v (X) despite the fact that
the optimal values for both problems are the same. In fact, this is usually the case as
the following example illustrates.
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5.2 The case of one leading currency and several eligible assets
In their 2009 paper [2] the authors introduce the following generalization of scalar
monetary measures of risk. Assume we are given a ”leading” (domestic) currency
(eligible asset number 1) and a set of d − 1 further eligible assets. One unit of asset
i has the deterministic price πi > 0 at initial time (with π1 = 1 and the random
price Si : Ω → IR+\ {0} at terminal time, i ∈ {1, . . . , d} (with S1 ≡ 1 while assuming
that money in the leading currency is invested in a risk free manner and everything
is discounted). An eligible portfolio x = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ IR
d (in ”physical” units) has
the price
∑d
i=1 πixi at initial time and S =
∑d
i=1 Sixi at terminal time. Let us further
assume that we are given a non-empty set A1 ⊆ L
0
1 of acceptable random payoffs in the
leading currency (we do not call it an acceptance set since we do not require further
properties yet). The function
̺ (Z) = inf
{
s ∈ IR: Z +
d∑
i=1
Sixi ∈ A1, x ∈ IR
d,
d∑
i=1
πixi = s
}
, Z ∈ L01,
corresponds to the risk measure of definition 2 in [2] if the set S therein has the d
members described above.
We reformulate the above model in terms of our previous constructions. We have
m = d, and the solvency cone at initial time is the polyhedral convex cone KI spanned
by the d− 1 vectors (
−1, 0, . . . , 0,
1
πi
, 0, . . . , 0
)
, i = 2, . . . , d,
their negatives and the vector (1, . . . , 1) ∈ IRd. The values of the solvency cone mapping
KT at terminal time are spanned by(
−1, 0, . . . , 0,
1
Si
, 0, . . . , 0
)
, i = 2, . . . , d,
their negatives and the vector (1I, . . . , 1I) ∈ Lpd. Both cones are closed half spaces (the
second one random) with normal vectors
(1, π2, . . . , πd) and (1I, S2, . . . , Sd) ,
respectively. That is, we are moving in a frictionless market. Define a set Â ⊆ L0d of
acceptable positions by
X = (X1, . . . , Xd) ∈ Â ⇐⇒
d∑
i=1
SiXi ∈ A1.
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It should be clear that Â is convex (a cone, KT -compatible) if and only if A1 is convex
(a cone, (Lp1)+-compatible). However, Â is not market-compatible in general even if
A1 is an acceptance set in L
p
1. For a random payoff X1 : Ω→ IR and u ∈ IR
d we have
(X1, 0, . . . , 0) + u1I ∈ Â ⇐⇒ X1 +
d∑
i=1
Siui ∈ A1.
The collection{
u ∈ IRd : (X1, 0, . . . , 0) + u1I ∈ Â
}
=
{
u ∈ IRd : X1 +
d∑
i=1
Siui ∈ A1
}
is the value of a set-valued risk measure R
Â
at (X1, 0, . . . , 0), and RÂ is KT -compatible.
Moreover,
̺ (X1) = inf
{
d∑
i=1
πiui : u ∈ RÂ ((X1, 0, . . . , 0))
}
.
Thus, ̺ is nothing else than the scalarization of RÂ (see the previous subsection) with
v = π ∈ K+I . By proposition 5.1 ̺ is also a scalarization of the risk measure RA with
A = clM
(
Â+KI1I
)
. This shows that the risk measures defined in [2] fit perfectly
into the framework of the present paper. In fact, the situation considered in [2] is a
very special case of our model: The idea of investing in eligible assets is covered by the
set-valued approach presented here. We illustrate this below with a toy example taken
from [2].
Moreover, the approach of [2] can easily be generalized to situations (a) where
proportional frictions are present together with (b) when there are future payoffs not
only in the ”leading” (domestic) currency and (c) when some assets are illiquid in the
sense that they can not be exchanged into certain others (in this case, some faces of
the solvency cones KI and/or KT coincide with certain faces of IR
d
+, this would mean
πi = +∞ or Si (ω) = +∞ for some i in the framework of [2]).
Finally, we should note that the question of a dual representation of the risk mea-
sures defined in [2] can easily be solved using the results of section 4. This problem
was not addressed in [2].
The following example is the first in the appendix of [2]. Take a probability space
with Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}. Consider the case d = m = 2, the (six dimensional) payoff
space L12
(
Ω, 2Ω, P
)
and the following market model: KI =
{
x ∈ IR2 : x1 + x2 ≥ 0
}
(one-to-one exchange between the two assets without transaction costs) and
KT (ω1) =
{
x ∈ IR2 : x1 + 2x2 ≥ 0
}
, KT (ω2) = KI , KT (ω3) =
{
x ∈ IR2 : 2x1 + x2 ≥ 0
}
.
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The payoff is given by X = (X1, 0) with X1 (ω1) = −16, X1 (ω2) = 1 and X1 (ω3) = −7.
We have{
u ∈ IR2 : X + u1I ∈ L12 (KT )
}
=
{
u ∈ IR2 : u1 + 2u2 ≥ 16, 2u1 + u2 ≥ 14
}
.
The unique minimal (in the sense of vector optimization, see [12], often called efficient)
point with respect to the reflexive, transitive relation generated by the cone KI (ac-
tually, a half space) is indeed the point (4, 6) computed in [2]. Obviously, transaction
costs can be introduced in the example in such a way that the main features remain
unchanged (”small” transaction costs) or such that the whole boundary of the above
set becomes ”efficient”.
Note that L12 (KT ) is not a market-compatible acceptance set, but the set L
1
2 (KT )+
KI1I is. Considering the set{
u ∈ IR2 : ∃k ∈ KI : X + (u− k) 1I ∈ L
1
2 (KT )
}
=
{
u ∈ IR2 : u1 − k1 + 2u2 − 2k2 ≥ 16, 2u1 − 2k1 + u2 − k1 ≥ 14, k1 + k2 ≥ 0
}
as the feasible set for a linear program with objective function u1+u2 (to be minimized)
we obtain from proposition 5.1 that the value of this program is again 10. The set of
solutions, however, is{
u ∈ IR2 : u1 = t + 4, u2 = −t + 6, t ∈ IR
}
.
This set consists of all initial positions which can be exchanged at initial time into (4, 6).
One should expect that a mathematical model admits to detect all such positions since
they are trivially ”as good as” the position (4, 6). Thus, even if there are no transaction
costs present, but random exchange rates it makes sense to use the set-valued approach
– because the latter yields more solutions among which an agent may choose.
5.3 Value at risk
We will give a general definition of value at risk which extends the one in [11] and [10]
to the case of a random solvency cone at terminal time.
Definition 5.2 Let α ∈ [0, 1] and a measurable set-valued mapping Dα : Ω→ P
(
IRd
)
be given which satisfy
(D0) Dα (ω) is a non-empty closed convex set for each ω ∈ Ω,
(D1a) IRd+ ⊆ Dα (ω) P -a.s.,
(D1b) −int IRd+ ∩Dα (ω) = ∅ P -a.s.,
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(D2) Dα (ω) + IR
d
+ ⊆ Dα (ω) P -a.s.
The value at risk V@Rα with respect to Dα is defined by
V@Rα (X) =
{
u ∈M : X + u1I ∈ ÂDα
}
, X ∈ Lpd,
where
ÂDα = {X ∈ L
p
d : P ({ω ∈ Ω: X (ω) ∈ Dα (ω)}) ≥ 1− α} .
It is easily seen that ÂDα is an acceptance set in L
p
d, 0 ≤ p ≤ ∞. If the requirement
(D2) is replaced by
(D2’) Dα (ω) +KT (ω) ⊆ Dα (ω) P -a.s.,
then
ADα = ÂDα +K
M
I 1I
is a market-compatible acceptance set, hence the corresponding risk measure is a
market-compatible value at risk. Note that condition (A1b) is not satisfied in gen-
eral as the example with m = 1, d = 2, Dα (ω) =
{
x ∈ IR2 : x2 ≥ 0
}
, M = IR × {0}
shows. An assumption like M ∩
(
IRd\Dα (ω)
)
6= ∅ P -a.s. avoids this situation.
The definition of value at risk in the case of random terminal prices is more cum-
bersome than the versions in [11]. Note also that the sets Dα (ω) above correspond to
the complement of the set D used in [11].
A choice for the mapping Dα which seems natural would be Dα (ω) = KT (ω). This
Dα satisfies (D0), (D1a), (D1b) and (D2’).
5.4 The worst case risk measure
The worst case risk measure should be generated by the smallest possible acceptance
set which includes 0 ∈ Lpd. This is (L
p
d)+ which certainly is an acceptance set in the
sense of definition 2.1. The augmented, market-compatible acceptance set is
A
p
WC = clM
(
L
p
d (KT ) +K
M
I 1I
)
,
which generates the risk measure
WCp (X) = {u ∈M : X + u1I ∈ ApWC} = cl
{
u ∈M : X + u1I ∈ Lpd (KT ) +K
M
I 1I
}
.
The set ApWC obviously satisfies M1I∩A
p
WC 6= ∅ (see (A1a)), and is market-compatible
(use lemma 6.1).
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A sufficient condition for M1I ∩ (Lpd\A) 6= ∅ (see (A1b)), is no arbitrage in the
market (see [17, Definition 1.6.], [15, p. 161]), that is for our case of a one-period
market
(Lpd (KT ) +KI1I) ∩ −L
p
d
(
IRd+
)
= {0}
since this implies (u− k) 1I 6∈ Lpd (KT ) for every u ∈ −IR
d
+\ {0} and every k ∈ KI .
Hence (A1b) follows from
(
−IRd+\ {0}
)
∩M 6= ∅.
Moreover, it is known that the robust no arbitrage condition (see [17, Definition
1.9], [15, Definition 3.1]) implies that the set Lpd (KT ) +KI1I is closed. In this case one
could drop the closure in ApWC below. In general, for p ≥ 1 the set
A
p
WC = cl
(
L
p
d (KT ) +K
M
I 1I
)
is a nontrivial closed convex cone in Lpd defining a closed coherent risk measure. The
dual cone of this cone in Lpd is the set
(ApWC)
+ =
{
Y ∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
: E [Y ] ∈ K+I +M
⊥
}
as one easily verifies.
On the other hand, according to theorem 4.1, equations (4.3) and (4.4) we have for
the corresponding risk measure
∀X ∈ Lpd : WC
p (X) =
⋂
(Q,w)∈Wqmax
F˜M(Q,w) [−X ]
with
Wqmax =
{
(Q,w) ∈MP1,d × IR
d : w ∈
(
K+I \M
⊥ +M⊥
)
, diag (w)
dQ
dP
∈ (ApWC)
+
}
.
Actually, we have Wqmax = W
q (see definition 4.1). Indeed, take (Q,w) ∈ Wq, i.e.
w ∈
(
K+I \M
⊥
)
+M⊥ and diag (w) dQ
dP
∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
. Then Y = diag (w) dQ
dP
∈ (ApWC)
+.
Indeed, taking X ∈ Lpd (KT ) and k ∈ K
M
I we obtain
E
[
Y T (X + k1I)
]
= E
[
XTdiag (w)
dQ
dP
]
+ kTw ≥ 0
because of the properties of Y and w. Thus, Wq ⊆ Wqmax. The converse inclusion is
trivial since Lpd (KT ) ⊆ A
p
WC .
In the case M = IRd this risk measure provides a link to superhedging theorems for
conical markets models as shown in subsection 5.6 below.
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5.5 Average value at risk
We will give a dual definition of Average Value at Risk which slightly differs from the
definition given in [10]. For λ ∈ (0, 1]d we define the vector
µ (λ) =
(
1
λ1
,
1
λ2
, . . . ,
1
λd
)T
and the set
W∞λ =
{
(Q,w) ∈ W∞ : diag (w)
(
µ (λ) 1I−
dQ
dP
)
∈ L∞d
(
K+T
)}
.
In contrast to the constant cone case KI ≡ KT , it may happen that the set W
∞
λ is
empty. If W∞λ 6= ∅ then
AV@Rλ (X) =
⋂
(Q,w)∈W∞
λ
(
EQ [−X ] +G (w)
)
∩M
defines a market-compatible coherent risk measure according to theorem 4.2.
5.6 Superhedging prices as a coherent risk measure
In this section, we show that the set of superhedging prices for a multivariate claim in a
market with proportional transaction costs can be understood as value of a set-valued
coherent risk measure. This is in complete analogy to the frictionless case, compare
for example [8, sections 1.3, 4.8].
In our notation, we mainly follow [17]. We consider a financial market with d
securities which can be traded over finite discrete time t = 0, . . . , T . The information
evolves according to a filtration (Ft)
T
t=0 on a probability space (Ω,F , P ) satisfying the
usual conditions. In particular, it is assumed that F0 is the trivial σ-algebra.
The market model is given by the solvency cone process (Kt (ω))
T
t=0 where Kt (ω) is
a closed convex cone with IRd+ ⊆ Kt (ω) 6= IR
d for all t = 0, . . . , T and all ω ∈ Ω. The
solvency cone Kt is the collection of positions transferrable into nonnegative positions
by taking into account the transaction costs at time t.
In contrast to the rest of the paper, where only the two time points t = 0 and t = T
were important, we are now also interested in trading at intermediate time points.
Thus, not only KI = K0 and KT play a role, but also the (random) solvency cones Kt
at intermediate time points will be of interest.
A portfolio vector is a random variable Vt : Ω→ IR
d. The values Vt (ω) of portfolio
vectors are given in physical units, i.e., Vt,i (ω) is the number of units of the ith asset
for i = 1, . . . , d in the portfolio at time t.
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An IRd-valued adapted process (Vt)
T
t=0 is called a self-financing portfolio process for
the market given by (Kt)
T
t=0 iff
∀t = 0, . . . , T : Vt − Vt−1 ∈ −Kt P − a.s.
with the convention V−1 = 0.
For t = 0, . . . , T , we denote by At ⊆ L
0
d (Ω,Ft, P ) the set of random vectors Vt : Ω→
IRd, each being the value of a self-financing portfolio process at time t, i.e. At is the set
of super-hedgeable claims starting from initial endowment 0 ∈ IRd. As it easily follows
from the definition of self-financing portfolio processes, At is a convex cone.
The fundamental theorem of asset pricing states that the robust no arbitrage con-
dition is satisfied for the market model (Kt)
T
t=0 if and only if there exists a strictly
consistent pricing process (Zt)
T
t=0 (see [17], theorem 1.7 for the case of a polyhedral
market model and [15], theorem 18 for the general case). The definitions are as fol-
lows.
The market given by (Kt)
T
t=0 is said to satisfy the robust no–arbitrage property
(NAr) iff there exists a market process
(
K˜t
)T
t=0
satisfying
Kt ⊆ K˜t and Kt\ −Kt ⊆ int K˜t P − a.s. (5.1)
for all t = 0, . . . , T such that
A˜T ∩ L
0
d
(
IRd+
)
= {0} ,
where A˜T is generated by the self-financing portfolio processes with
∀t = 0, . . . , T : Vt − Vt−1 ∈ −K˜t P − a.s.
An IRd+-valued adapted process Z = (Zt)
T
t=0 is called a (strictly) consistent pricing
process for the market model (Kt)
T
t=0 if Z is a martingale under P and
∀t = 0, . . . , T : Zt ∈ K
+
t \ {0}
(
∈ riK+t
)
P − a.s.
The superhedging price of a claim X ∈ L0d can be characterized as follows.
Theorem 5.3 ([17], theorem 4.1, [15], corollary 15) Assume that the market pro-
cess (Kt)
T
t=0 satisfies the robust no-arbitrage condition (NA
r). Then, the following
conditions are equivalent for X ∈ L0d and u
0 ∈ IRd:
(i) X − u0 ∈ AT , i.e. there is a self-financing portfolio process (Vt)
T
t=0 such that
u0 + VT = X P − a.s.
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(ii) For every consistent (or, equivalently, strictly consistent) pricing process Z =
(Zt)
T
t=0 such that the negative part
(
XTZT
)−
is integrable it holds
E
[
XTZT
]
≤
(
u0
)T
Z0.
Proof. This follows from theorem 18 in [15] in the same way as Theorem 4.1
follows from theorem 1.7 in [17] if one observes that lemma 2.5 in [17] can be replaced
by condition (5.1). 
An element u0 ∈ IRd satisfying the conditions of theorem 5.3 is called a superhedging
price of X . Now, we shall show that the map assigning to X the collection of its
superhedging prices defines a closed coherent risk measure on L0d.
Corollary 5.4 An element u0 ∈ IRd is a superhedging price for the claim X ∈ L0d if
and only if u0 ∈ R−AT (−X) with
R−AT (−X) :=
{
u ∈ IRd : −X + u1I ∈ −AT
}
. (5.2)
If the market process (Kt)
T
t=0 satisfies the robust no-arbitrage condition (NA
r), then
R−AT is a closed coherent market-compatible risk measure on L
0
d and has the following
representation
R−AT (−X) =
⋂
{
(Q,w)∈W1
{0,...,T}
: EQ[X−]<∞
}
(
EQ [X ] +G (w)
)
, (5.3)
where
W1{0,...,T} =
{
(Q,w) ∈MP1,d × IR
d\ {0} :
E
[
diag (w)
dQ
dP
∣∣∣Ft] ∈ L1d (Ω,Ft, P ;K+t ) for all t = 0, . . . , T}.
Proof. Condition (i) of theorem 5.3 leads to the first assertion. The set −AT is
an acceptance set in the sense of definition 2.1. Indeed, the first condition is trivial,
the second one follows from the the robust no-arbitrage condition (NAr) and the third
one holds since by definition, −AT = K01I+L
0
d (Ω,F1, P ;K1)+ . . .+L
0
d (Ω,FT , P ;KT )
and Kt (ω) is a convex cone with IR
d
+ ⊆ Kt (ω) for t = 0, . . . , T and all ω ∈ Ω. This last
condition also implies that −AT isKt-compatible (see definition 2.7) for all t = 0, . . . , T
and thus market-compatible. Furthermore, −AT ⊆ L
0
d is a convex cone and closed in L
0
d
(see [17], theorem 2.1 for the polyhedral case and [15], theorem 7 for the general case),
thus also directionally closed. Via the primal representation (2.2) with M = IRd, −AT
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defines a risk measure R−AT on L
0
d, which is closed coherent and market-compatible
according to proposition 2.8, 2.13 and 2.16.
By theorem 5.3 (ii) the set R−AT (−X) of superhedging prices of X can also be
written in the following form
R−AT (−X) =
⋂
Z∈CPP
{
u ∈ IRd : E
[
XTZT
]
≤ ZT0 u
}
, (5.4)
where CPP is the set of consistent pricing processes Z = (Zt)
T
t=0 such that the negative
part
(
XTZT
)−
is integrable. The idea of lemma 3.5 can be applied to consistent pricing
processes in order to get the representation (5.3). Indeed, starting with a consistent
pricing process Z, one obtains a pair (Q,w) ∈ W1{0,...,T} by defining w := E [ZT ] = Z0 ∈
K+0 \ {0} and
dQi
dP
:=
1
wi
(ZT )i if wi > 0,
for i = 1, . . . , d and choosing dQi
dP
as a density of a probability measure in L1d(IR
d
+) if
wi = 0. Conversely, a pair (Q,w) ∈ W
1
{0,...,T} yields a consistent pricing process Z
by setting ZT = diag (w)
dQ
dP
and Zt = E [ZT |Ft] for t = 0, . . . , T . Together with the
representation (5.4) this leads to (5.3). 
Note that for X ∈ L0d, the set of dual elements in (5.3) depends on the particular
argument X . This is no longer the case for X ∈ Lpd, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ as we will see below
in equation (5.5).
Corollary 5.5 Assume (NAr). For X ∈ Lpd, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, the superhedging prices of X
form the value of a closed coherent market-compatible risk measure on Lpd with primal
representation
Rp (−X) :=
{
u ∈ IRd : −X + u1I ∈ −ApT
}
,
where ApT := AT ∩ L
p
d, and dual representation
Rp (−X) =
⋂
(Q,w)∈Wq
{0,...,T}
(
EQ [X ] +G (w)
)
, (5.5)
where
Wq{0,...,T} =
{
(Q,w) ∈ MP1,d × IR
d\ {0} :
E
[
diag (w)
dQ
dP
∣∣∣Ft] ∈ Lqd(Ω,Ft, P ;K+t ) for all t = 0, . . . , T}. (5.6)
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Proof. This follows since −ApT := −AT ∩L
p
d is a closed convex cone and a market-
compatible acceptance set for 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ (if p = ∞ the σ(L∞d , L
1
d) closedness follows
with help of lemma A.64 in [8]). The dual representation follows from theorem 4.2 in
connection with corollary 5.4. 
In analogy to the frictionless case, equations (5.3) and (5.5) show that the super-
hedging prices for a multivariate claim X form indeed the value of a set-valued coherent
risk measure at −X .
Remark 5.6 In contrast to theorem 4.2, a dynamic coupling condition appears in
(5.6), which is due to the fact, that also the intermediate time points t = 0, . . . , T
are important and enter the risk measure through its acceptance set. The dynamic
coupling condition in (5.6) ensures that the pricing process (Zt)
T
t=0 corresponding to
(Q,w) is consistent with the market (Kt)
T
t=0 at every time point t = 0, . . . , T . Note
that M⊥ = {0}, and the dynamic coupling condition in (5.6) for t = 0 implies that
w ∈ K+0 \ {0} as well as diag (w)
dQ
dP
∈ Lqd
(
K+T
)
for t = T .
Remark 5.7 The vector probability measures Q with (Q,w) ∈ W1{0,...,T} can be seen as
equivalent martingale measures. Indeed, the component Qi, i = 1, . . . , d, is an equiva-
lent martingale measure in the sense of [7] if asset i is chosen as nume´raire. Instead
of choosing a particular nume´raire in advance, we work with all possible nume´raires,
i.e. with all Q1, . . . , Qd representing one (scalar) equivalent martingale measure, at the
same time.
6 Appendix
6.1 Directionally closed sets in Lpd
As before, we use the symbol uk
M
−→ 0 in order to denote a sequence
{
uk
}
k∈IN
⊂ M
with limk→∞ u
k = 0. Recall (see definition 2.15) that the set
clMA =
{
X ∈ Lpd : ∃u
k M−→ 0: ∀k ∈ IN: X + uk1I ∈ A
}
is called the directional closure of A in M . The following immediate results show that
this definition makes sense.
Lemma 6.1 If A ⊆ Lpd, then A ⊆ clMA, and clMA is directionally closed in M .
Moreover, if A,B ⊆ Lpd, then clMA + clMB ⊆ clM (A+B).
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Proof. By definition, A ⊆ clMA. Next, we shall show that clMA is directionally
closed. Take X ∈ Lpd and u
n M−→ 0 such that
∀n ∈ IN: X + un1I ∈ clMA.
Then, for each n ∈ IN there is vn,k
M
−→ 0 (for k →∞) such that
∀k ∈ IN: X +
(
un + vn,k
)
1I ∈ A.
Define a new sequence {wn}n∈IN ⊆M by setting w
1 = u1+ v1,1 and wn = un+ vn,kn for
n = 2, 3, . . . such that
∣∣vn,kn∣∣ ≤ 1
2
∣∣vn−1,kn−1∣∣. This is possible since vn,k → 0 as k →∞
for all n ∈ IN. Thus, wn = un + vn,kn
M
−→ 0 and
∀n ∈ IN: X + wn1I ∈ A.
Hence X ∈ clMA by definition of the directional closure. For the last claim, take X ∈
clMA+clMB. Then there are X
A ∈ clMA and X
B ∈ clMB such that X = X
A+XB.
By definition of the directional closure there are sequences uk
M
−→ 0 and vk
M
−→ 0 such
that
∀k ∈ IN: XA + uk1I ∈ A, XB + vk1I ∈ B.
Hence XA +XB +
(
uk + vk
)
1I ∈ A +B which implies XA +XB ∈ clM (A+B) since(
uk + vk
) M
−→ 0. 
Lemma 6.2 If A ⊆ Lpd and X ∈ L
p
d, then
{u ∈M : X + u1I ∈ clMA} = cl {u ∈M : X + u1I ∈ A} . (6.1)
Proof. Directly from definition 2.15. 
Remark 6.3 If A is closed in Lpd then it is obviously directionally closed in M for each
possible M . This also holds for the σ (L∞d , L
1
d)-topology on L
∞
d .
6.2 Translative functions on Lpd
The first result links the graph and the zero sublevel set of an M-translative function.
Proposition 6.4 A function R : Lpd → P (M) is translative in M if and only if
graphR = {(X, u) ∈ Lpd ×M : X + u1I ∈ AR} . (6.2)
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Proof. Indeed, if R is translative in M , then (X, u) ∈ graphR if and only if
u ∈ IR (X) if and only if 0 ∈ R (X + u1I) by (2.1) if and only if X + u1I ∈ AR by (2.3).
On the other hand, if (6.2) is true, then w ∈ R (X + u1I) for u, w ∈ M if and only
if (X + u1I, w) ∈ graphR if and only if X + (u+ w) 1I ∈ AR by (6.2) if and only if
(X, u+ w) ∈ graphR again (6.2) if and only if u+ w ∈ graphR which is translativity
in M . 
The following proposition has to be read as follows: The properties for R and A
given in (a) through (m) produce two equivalencies, the first being that R has the
property in question if and only if AR has the corresponding property, and the second
that A has the property in question if and only if RA has the corresponding property.
Proposition 6.5 The following properties are in a one-to-one relationship for an M-
translative function R : Lpd → P (M) and a subset A ⊆ L
p
d:
(a) R is B-monotone, and A+B ⊆ A;
(b) R (0) 6= ∅, and M1I ∩ A 6= ∅;
(c) R (0) 6=M , and M1I ∩ (Lpd\A) 6= ∅;
(d) R maps into the set PKM
I
=
{
D ⊆M : D = D +KMI
}
, and A+KMI 1I ⊆ A;
(e) R is convex, and A is convex;
(f) R is positively homogeneous, and A is a cone;
(g) R is subadditive, and A + A ⊆ A;
(h) R is sublinear, and A is a convex cone;
(i) R has closed images, and A is directionally closed with respect to M ;
(k) R has a closed graph, and A is closed;
(l) R (X) 6= ∅ for all X ∈ Lpd, and L
p
d = A +M1I;
(m) R (X) 6=M for all X ∈ Lpd, and L
p
d = (L
p
d\A) +M1I.
Proof. We only give proofs for A and RA. The corresponding proofs for R and
AR follow since R = RAR and A = ARA according to proposition 2.4.
(a) Assume A + B ⊆ A and take X1, X2 ∈ Lpd such that X
2 − X1 ∈ B. Take
u ∈ RA (X
1). Then 0 ∈ RA (X
1 + u1I) by translativity and hence X1 + u1I ∈ ARA = A
(see proposition 2.4). By assumption, X2 + u1I = X1 + u1I + X2 − X1 ∈ A, hence
u ∈ RA (X
2). This implies RA (X
1) ⊆ RA (X
2) as required. Vice versa, assuming the
B-monotonicity of RA and taking X
1 ∈ A, X2 ∈ B we obtain
0 ∈ RA
(
X1
)
⊆ RA
(
X1 +X2
)
since X1 +X2 −X1 ∈ B.
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(b) and (c) are easily checked using the definition of RA.
(d) Assume A+KMI 1I ⊆ A, and take u ∈ RA (X), u
′ ∈ KMI . Then X+u1I ∈ A. The
assumption implies X + (u+ u′) 1I ∈ A, hence u + u′ ∈ RA (X) by (2.2). Assume RA
maps into the set PKM
I
. Then 0 ∈ RA (X + u1I) + u ⊆ RA (X + u1I) whenever X ∈ A
and u ∈ KMI since RA is M-translative.
(e) – (g) are easily checked.
(h) is a consequence of (f) and (g).
(i) Assume that A is directionally closed inM . Take a sequence
{
uk
}
k∈IN
⊂ RA (X)
with limk→∞ u
k = u. Then by (2.2)X+uk1I = (X + u1I)+
(
uk − u
)
1I ∈ A for all k ∈ IN.
Since A is directionally closed in M this implies X + u1I ∈ A which gives u ∈ RA (X).
Conversely, ifX ∈ Lpd, u
k M−→ 0 andX+uk1I ∈ A then 0 ∈ RA
(
X + uk1I
)
= RA (X)−u
k
for all k ∈ IN. Since RA (X) is closed 0 ∈ RA (X), i.e. X ∈ A = ARA.
(k) Use proposition 6.4.
(l), (m) Immediate. 
The preceding proposition together with proposition 2.4 can be used as a toolbox for
one-to-one correspondences between classes of risk measures and classes of acceptance
sets. For example, closed convex risk measure which are finite at zero are one-to-
one with closed convex acceptance sets satisfying (A1a) and (A1b). We also mention
that proposition 6.5 also includes the case m = d = 1 which produces the well-known
correspondence results for extended real-valued risk measures and their acceptance sets
in Lp1 - even for 0 ≤ p ≤ ∞.
6.3 Convex set-valued functions and proof of the main theo-
rem
Fact 1. R : Lpd → P (M) is convex if and only if graphR is convex. The proof is
straightforward.
Fact 2. A M-translative function R is convex if and only if AR is convex if and only
if all sets of the form
{X ∈ Lpd : u ∈ R (X)} , u ∈M,
are convex. Proposition 6.4 produces this fact.
Fact 3. If R is closed convex and R (X0) 6= M for X0 ∈ Lpd with R (X
0) 6= ∅, then
R (X) 6= ∅ for all X ∈ Lpd. See [9], proposition 5.
For the proof of theorem 4.2, we shall make use of the Fenchel conjugation concept
for set-valued functions introduced in [9], [10]. Let R : Lpd → P (M) be a function. The
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Legendre–Fenchel conjugate of R is defined to be
−R∗ (Y, v) = cl
⋃
X∈Lp
d
(
R (X) + FM(Y,v) [−X ]
)
, Y ∈ Lqd, v ∈M.
The definition of the biconjugate depends on the order relation in the image space.
For KI-compatible risk measures, the appropriate image space and the order relation
will be generated by the cone KMI . The following remark justifies the definition of the
biconjugate giving afterwards.
Remark 6.6 If R : Lpd → P (M) is a closed convex and KI-compatible risk measure,
then R (X) ∈ GM =
{
D ⊆ IRd : D = cl co
(
D +KMI
)}
for all X ∈ Lpd. In this case,
the additional dual variable v can be restricted to
(
KMI
)+
(compare proposition 3.3,
(f)).
The biconjugate of a function R : Lpd → GM is defined by
R∗∗ (X) =
⋂
Y ∈Lq
d
, v∈(KMI )
+
\{0}
(
−R∗ (Y, v) + FM(Y,v) [X ]
)
, X ∈ Lpd.
Note that in these definitions the FM(Y,v)’s act as substitutes for real-valued continuous
linear functions. Note also that v is an additional dual variable in comparison to the
scalar case which reflects the order in the image space as it will become clear presently.
The following facts are basic results, see [9, proposition 11], [10, proposition 6.2]: We
have −R∗ : Lqd×
(
KMI
)+
→ GM , and R
∗∗ maps indeed into GM . The image −R
∗ (Y, v)
is of the form u+ FM(Y,v) [0] = u+G (v) for some u ∈M or an element of {M, ∅}.
The Fenchel–Moreau theorem for set-valued functions holds true: Let R : Lpd → GM ,
1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ be a function which is closed (σ (L∞d , L
1
d)-closed in case p = ∞), convex,
proper, then R = R∗∗. Compare theorem 2 in [9].
It turns out that Fenchel conjugates for set-valued risk measures can be computed
in terms of set-valued support functions of their acceptance sets.
Proposition 6.7 Let R : Lpd → GM be a market-compatible convex risk measure which
is finite at zero and has the acceptance set AR. Take Y ∈ L
q
d and v ∈
(
KMI
)+
\ {0}.
Then
− R∗ (Y, v) =
{
−SAR (Y, v) : Y ∈ −L
q
d
(
K+T
)
, v ∈ E [−Y ] +M⊥
M : else
(6.3)
where
−SAR (Y, v) = cl
⋃
X∈AR
FM(Y,v) [−X ] .
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If R is additionally positively homogeneous, then
−R∗ (Y, v) =
{
G (v) ∩M : Y ∈ −A+R, v ∈ E [−Y ] +M
⊥
M : else
(6.4)
Proof. Obviously,
−R∗ (Y, v) ⊇ cl
⋃
X∈AR
(
R (X) + FM(Y,v) [−X ]
)
⊇ cl
⋃
X∈AR
FM(Y,v) [−X ] ,
hence −R∗ (Y, v) ⊇ −SAR (Y, v) for all Y ∈ L
q
d, v ∈ IR
d.
If Y 6∈ −Lqd
(
K+T
)
then there is X0 ∈ Lpd (KT ) such that E
[
Y TX0
]
> 0. By (A1a)
applied to AR, there is u
0 ∈M such that u01I ∈ AR, hence u
01I+Lpd (KT ) ⊆ AR. Using
the definition of FM(Y,v) [−u
01I− tX0] we obtain
−SAR (Y, v) ⊇ cl
⋃
X∈u01I+Lp
d
(KT )
FM(Y,v) [−X ] ⊇
⋃
t>0
FM(Y,v)
[
−u01I− tX0
]
=M.
Hence −R∗ (Y, v) ⊇ −SAR (Y, v) =M whenever Y 6∈ −L
q
d
(
K+T
)
.
Now, assume E [Y ] + v 6∈M⊥ and consider w ∈ M . Then
FM(Y,v) [−w1I] =
{
u ∈M : 0 ≤ vTu+ E [Y ]T w
}
=
{
u− w ∈M : 0 ≤ vT (u− w) + (E [Y ] + v)T w
}
+ w
=
{
u ∈M : 0 ≤ vTu+ (E [Y ] + v)T w
}
+ w.
Since E [Y ] + v 6∈ M⊥ for each u ∈ M we can find w ∈ M such that 0 ≤ vTu +
(E [Y ] + v)T w. Therefore, it holds⋃
w∈M
(
FM(Y,v) [−w1I]− w
)
=M
and a fortiori, since R (0) 6= ∅ by (R1a),
−R∗ (Y, v) = cl
⋃
X∈Lp
d
,w∈M
(
R (X + w1I) + FM(Y,v) [−X − w1I]
)
⊇ cl
⋃
w∈M
(
R (0)− w + FM(Y,v) [−w1I]
)
=M.
It remains to show that −R∗ (Y, v) ⊆ −SAR (Y, v) for Y ∈ −L
q
d
(
K+T
)
, E [Y ] + v ∈
M⊥. Indeed, taking u ∈ R (X) with X ∈ domR we obtain X + u1I ∈ AR and with
Proposition 3.3 (applied with Y replaced by −Y )
−SAR (Y, v) ⊇ F
M
(Y,v) [−X − u1I] = F
M
(Y,v) [−X ] + u.
34
Therefore, R (X) + FM(Y,v) [−X ] ⊆ −SAR (Y, v) for all X ∈ L
p
d, and hence −R
∗ (Y, v) ⊆
−SAR (Y, v).
Now, let R be additionally positively homogeneous. If Y 6∈ −A+R then there is X
0 ∈
AR such that E
[
Y TX0
]
> 0 which yields
⋃
X∈AR
FM(Y,v) [−X ] ⊇
⋃
t>0 F
M
(Y,v) [−tX
0] =
M , and a fortiori −R∗ (Y, v) = M by (6.3). If Y ∈ −A+R then E
[
Y TX
]
≤ 0 for all
X ∈ AR, hence F
M
(Y,v) [−X ] ⊆ F
M
(Y,v) [0] for all X ∈ AR and therefore, since 0 ∈ AR
FM(Y,v) [0] ⊆
⋃
X∈AR
FM(Y,v) [−X ] ⊆ F
M
(Y,v) [0] .
This completes the proof of the proposition. 
The reader may note that formula (6.4) gives the conjugate of a sublinear risk
measure in terms of a set-valued indicator function if one agrees to interpret G (v)∩M
as ”zero” and M as ”−∞”. This interpretation, a perfect analogy to the scalar case,
can be made more precise. See [9] for more details.
Remark 6.8 Let Â ⊆ Lpd be a convex acceptance set. Then, the set A = cl
(
Â+KMI 1I
)
is closed convex and
∀Y ∈ Lqd, ∀v ∈
(
KMI
)+
\ {0} : − SA (Y, v) = −SÂ (Y, v) .
Indeed, while ”⊇” is trivial the converse inclusion follows from the fact that
FM(Y,v) [−X ] +K
M
I ⊆ F
M
(Y,v) [−X ]
since v ∈
(
KMI
)+
and a continuity argument. This observation can also be seen as an
analogy to a well-known scalar fact: The extended real-valued support function of a set
coincides with the support function to the closure of the convex hull of this set.
Proof of theorem 4.2. Assume that R is a closed convex risk measure which
is finite at zero. From the Fenchel–Moreau theorem for set-valued functions (see [9],
theorem 2) and proposition 6.7 we obtain
R (X) =
⋂
Y ∈−Lq
d(K
+
T ), v∈(E[−Y ]+M⊥)∩(KMI )
+
\{0}
[
−SAR (Y, v) + F
M
(Y,v) [X ]
]
. (6.5)
By lemma 3.5 we have Y ∈ −Lqd
(
K+T
)
and v ∈
(
E [−Y ] +M⊥
)
∩
(
KMI
)+
\ {0} if and
only if we can find (Q,w) ∈ Wq such that
∀X ∈ Lpd : F˜
M
(Q,w) [X ] = F
M
(Y,v) [−X ] (6.6)
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since FM(−Y,v) [X ] = F
M
(Y,v) [−X ]. For pairs (Y, v), (Q,w) satisfying (6.6) we obtain
−SAR (Y, v) = cl
⋃
X∈AR
FM(Y,v) [−X ] = cl
⋃
X∈AR
FM(−Y,v) [X ] = cl
⋃
X∈AR
F˜M(Q,w) [X ] .
Defining a function −S˜AR : W
q → GM by
−S˜AR (Q,w) = cl
⋃
X∈AR
F˜M(Q,w) [X ]
we get
−SAR (Y, v) + F
M
(Y,v) [X ] = −S˜AR (Q,w) + F˜
M
(Q,w) [−X ]
whenever (Y, v), (Q,w) satisfy (6.6). This gives (4.1) with −αR = −αR,min = −S˜AR
because F˜M(Q,w) [−X ] =
(
EQ [−X ] +G (w)
)
∩M (see lemma 3.5).
The function −αR,min = −S˜AR indeed has all the properties of a penalty function.
The very definition of the F˜M(Q,w)’s ensures that −S˜AR maps into GM . The properties
in (P0) follow from R (0) 6= ∅ and R (0) 6=M , respectively. (P1) is a consequence of
−S˜AR (Q,w) +G (w) = cl
⋃
X∈AR
F˜M(Q,w) [X ] + G (w) ⊆ cl
⋃
X∈AR
F˜M(Q,w) [X ] .
Finally, if (4.1) is satisfied for a penalty function −αR then
∀X ∈ Lpd, ∀ (Q,w) ∈ W
q : R (X) ⊆ −αR (Q,w) + F˜
M
(Q,w) [X ] .
Adding F˜M(Q,w) [−X ] on both sides of the inclusion and taking the union over X ∈ L
p
d
on the left hand side we obtain in view of the properties of a penalty function
cl
⋃
X∈Lp
d
(
R (X) + F˜M(Q,w) [−X ]
)
⊆ −αR (Q,w) .
The left hand side of this inclusion is nothing else then the conjugate of R expressed
in terms of (Q,w) instead of (Y, v). Via lemma 3.5 we get with the help of proposition
6.7 −αR,min (Q,w) ⊆ −αR (Q,w) for all (Q,w) ∈ W
q.
Vice versa, one may check directly that R generated via (4.1) by a given penalty
function −αR is a closed convex risk measure.
The coherent case follows with the help of (6.4). 
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